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Scholars ofpostwar Japanese economic history
generally agree that Japanese monetary policy
has significantly influenced the cyclical vari-
ations in the nation's economy. According to a
common view, the authorities reacted to reserve
losses during the 1950's and 1960's by slowing
the rateofmonetaryexpansion, thereby reducing
the growth of investment and real GNP. Mone-
tary policy was the government's primary
counter-cyclical policy tool throughout most of
this period, since deficit finance was severely
constrained both by law and by the relatively un-
derdeveloped state of Japanese capital markets.
This explanation reflects a widely held view of
the influence of monetary policy upon economic
activity. Until recently, most economists believed
that, despite the lack ofany permanent relation-
ships, variations in money growth exert a signifi-
cant and systematic temporary influence on real
growth and unemployment. This view, supported
bystatistical analyses ofthevarious empirical re-
lationships involved, implied that counter-cycli-
cal monetary policy can, in principle, reduce
fluctuations in real income. Because of the wide
acceptance of this hypothesis, debates about
counter-cyclical monetary policy have tended to
focus on whetherenough is known about the tim-
ing and magnitude of the effect of money-stock
changes for such a policy to be effectively em-
ployed.
Recently, however, several economists have
suggested that counter-cyclical monetary policy,
as normally implemented, exerts no systematic
impact on real economic activity in either the
short run or the long run. Their argument rests
on two distinct contentions.
First, they claim that private agents intelli-
gently use all available information in forecast-
ing economic events. This hypothesis, known as
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rational expectations, implies that policy rules
relating money growth to observable variables,
such as past employment or prices, will be used
by private agents to forecast future money
stocks. Secondly, they assert that anticipated
money-stock changes do not influence real out-
put even in the short run. Under this hypothesis,
variations in prices, rather than real spending,
absorb predictable fluctuations in money growth
rates.
These two propositions imply that counter-cy-
clical monetary policy has no systematic effect
on real variables once private agents determine
how the authorities conduct their policy. Once
the policy is known, the changes in the money
supply it produces are predictable, so that they
then cease to influence real activity. If this
view is correct, a rule prescribing steady money
growth becomes more desirable. Such a rule then
is no less effective than any other in smoothing
business cycles, and may possess the additional
virtue of minimizing uncertainty about official
policy.
This article attempts to test whether Japanese
real growth in the 1957-77 period was systemati-
cally influenced by the changes in the Japanese
money stock that could have been predicted by
an informed economic observer. Evidence that in
the U.S. predictable money growth had no influ-
ence on real activity has been presented by Barro
(3,1977) and Sargent (8,1976). More generally,
the article examines whether anticipated and un-
anticipated money growth had different impacts
on Japanese real output.
In section I ofthis paper, we review several the-
ories concerning the impact of counter-cyclical
monetary policy, and examine the assumptions
underlying the contention that it is ineffective. It
is argued that because of"frictions" such as con-
tractual wage and price agreements, counter-cy-
clical monetary policy may influence output even
if expectations are fully rational.growth· temporarily influenced the growth of
Japaneseindustrial production and ofreal GNP.
They also suggest that anticipated and unantici-
patedcomponents ofmoney growth had qualita-
tivelydifferent impacts upon Japanese economic
activity.
Section II presents an equation explaining Jap-
anese Ml growth over the 1957-77 period, and
uses this to estimate the anticipated component
ofmoney changes. Section III tests the relation-
ship between changes in the money stock and
real economic activity. The results, although far
from conclusive, suggest that anticipated money
I. Theories of Counter-Cyclical Monetary PoliCY
Developments of the last several years have
raised doubts about the value of monetary and
fiscalpolicies in combatting cyclical variations
inincomeand employment. Traditional stimulus
instruments----tax cuts, public-wol'ks expendi-
tures, expansive monetary measures-that
seemed effective during the 1960's appear now to
have lost their effectiveness in many industrial
countries. Public confidence in "fine-tuning" is
at a low ebb.
Partly as a result of these events, theoretical
views of the impact of counter-cyclical policies
have changed substantially. This revision has
centered around the theme of expectations:
how agents form them and how they influence
behavior.
These developments are illustrated by the evo-
lution of theories about the influence of mone-
tary policy on economic activity. During the
1960's, many economists believed that there was
a stable-and in practical terms, permanent-
trade-off between inflation and unemployment.
The implication was that government could re-
duce the average unemployment level by in-
creasing the long-run inflation rate through ex-
pansionary monetary policy. This view greatly
influenced macro-economic policy in the U.S.
and other industrial countries. 1
As theoretical attempts to justify this hypoth-
esis failed-and as the trade-off became increas-
ingly unstable beginning in the mid-1960's-
most economists came to view significant sys-
tematic associations between inflation and un-
employment as temporary. The new theories
developed to explain the short-run relation be-
tween these variables came to be based on the
propositions that a) unemployment is influenced
by unanticipated but not by anticipated vari-
ations in the price level; and b) in the long run,
actual and anticipated inflation rates are equal.
Hence an increase in the inflation rate could
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have only a transient influence on economic ac-
tivity.
However, because such theories required only
that actual and.anticipated price changes co-
incide eventually, they generally left open the
possibility that monetary policy could systemati-
cally influence real output over the business cy-
cle. In empirical applications, expected price
changes were normally assumed to depend on
past inflation and (in some cases) other variables
in a manner invariant to changes in government
policy. This implied that the authorities could
successfully conduct counter-cyclical monetary
policy by relating unanticipated price and money
changes to past fluctuations in activity, as we will
see below.
The theory of "rational expectations," intro-
duced by Muth (6, 1961) and developed further
by Barro (2,1976), Sargent (8,1976), Lucas (5,
1975) and others, considerably refined the for-
mulation ofexpectations in such models by mak-
ing anticipations depend explicitly upon the
structure ofthe economy and government policy.
But, when combined with the assumption that
predictable money changes have no influence on
real activity, this view implies that counter-cy-
clical monetary policy is ineffective once the
private sector determines how the policy is con-
ducted.
Tile Phillips curve
To illustrate the implications for monetary
policy of these different views, consider a simple
model of the unemployment rate.
u(t) =ao+alu(t-l)+a2u(t-2) + Z +e(t) (1)
where u(t) is the unemployment rate at time t,
e(t) is a random disturbance, and Z is a set of
other variables influencing unemployment, in-
cluding policy instruments. The unemployment
rate is affected by its own past values because of
delayed responses of consumption and invest-menttoincome and other lagged relations. Be-
causeofthisdependence, a changein u(t) caused
bythe disturbance leads to further changes be-
foreullemployment returns to its long-run level.
Inthis. way, fluctuations in unemployment that
resemble business cycles are produced. This
processisdescribedin detail by Larry Butler in
the spring 1977 issue ofthis Review.2
Counter-cyclical policies are designed to re-
ducetheseverity and duration ofbusiness cycles.
This is done. by using the government's instru-
mentscol1tainedin Zto offset the effects ofpast
fluctuations inu(t); This, in effect, changes the
relation.between current and past unemploy-
ment.and reduces business-cycle fluctuations.
The controversy raised by rational expectations
centers about how the government accomplishes
this task.
During the 1960's it was widely believed that
one elementof Z was the actual change in prices
Lip(t) (=p(t) - pet-I). This relation was known
as the "Phillips Curve".3 A simple version ofthis
relation can be written as:
u(t) =ao + alu(t-l) + a2u(t-2)
- a3Lip(t) + e(t) (2)
where a3 is positive. This implied that the gov-
ernmentcould, by varying money-supply growth,
manipulate price changes, thereby influencing
unemployment. In addition to smoothing eco-
nomic cycles, the appropriate choice of money-
stockgrowth could influence the long-run rate of
inflation, and thus permanently alter the average
rate of unemployment as well.4
Natural-rate hypothesis
This view of the relation between monetary
policy and economic activity has now been large-
ly discarded by economists. Current theories
generally incorporate the "natural rate" hypoth-
esis that trade-offs between inflation and unem-
ployment are at best temporary, although pos-
sibly long-Iived.s
This hypothesis says that the unemployment
rate is equal in the long run to a value, known as
the"natural rateofunemployment", which is de-
termined by thecost ofsearching for jobs, the de-
mographic composition of the labor force and
other factors. The natural rate is assumed to be
unaffected by changes in the money stock or in-
flation. This reflects a proposition known as
the "neutrality" of money, which asserts that a
8
cha.ngein money leads eventually to a propor-
tionaLchange in all prices~leaving unaffected
allrelativeprices andall determinantsofthenat-
uraL rate. The proposition follows intuitively
fromithe observation that a typical individual
whose money holdings are doubled while all
pricesareraisedinthe••same.proportion has pre-
9is~lytlles~l11ereaLincome and real money bal-
ances, and·therefore the same opportunities for
consumption· and leisure,·as he did previously;
thus his behavior should not be altered.6
MosFforIlll.llations of the· natural-rate·theory
aSSume thatpredictable changesin money have
the same effects inthe short run as in the long
rUn. Anticipated money-stock changes are often
assumed to lead immediately to proportional
changes in all prices, leaving unemployment and
realoutputunaltered. This implies, in effect, that
individual spending decisions depend only upon
currentand future relative prices and real money
balances, and not upon variations in the level of
prices.?
Natural-rate theories attribute temporary as-
sociations between unemployment and inflation
to unanticipated changes in money and the price
level. According to one account, an unexpected
rise in the money stock raises aggregate demand.
Becausethe increase in the total money stock is
not immediately perceived (in part because reii-
able statistics are published with a lag), firms
generally confuse the increase in aggregate de-
mand with an improvement in the market for
their own products. Firms then move up their
supply curves, increasing employment, output
and prices. However, once the money-stock in-
crease becomes known, output and employment
return to their normal levels. Natural-rate theor-
ies thus implythatanunanticipated money-stock
increase initially stimulates activity. Further-
more, because a sustained increase in the growth
rateofmoney must eventually become anticipat-
ed, its influence on economic activity cannot be
permanent.8
Tile natural rate and counter-cyclical policy
A simple version ofthe unemployment relation
implied by natural-rate theories is:
u(t) :=ao+ alu(t-I) + a2u(t-2)
-a3(Lip(t) - Lip(t)e) + e(t) (3)
where now Llp(t)e is the change in the level ofprices anticipated by economic agents. As ex-
plained above, a3 is generally assumed to be posi-
tive.9
In contrast to the earlier unemployment rela-
tion, this implies that a sustained change in the
growth ofthe money stock has no permanent in-
fluenceon ecollofuic activity. This is because
money-stock changes, and the inflation they
cause, eventually become anticipated; that is
.ip(t) = Ap(t)e in thelong run. Hence, the unem-
ployment rate returns to its "natural" level.
However, until recently formulations of this
theory implied that counter-cyclical monetary
policy could at least exert a short-run influence
on economic activity. The reason is that expecta-
tions about prices and money growth were as-
sumed to be formed in a manner that did not
directly depend upon government policy. Under
"adaptive" expectations, for example, expected
prices changes were a function of past inflation:
n
.ip(t)e = ~h(i).ip(t-i) (4)
i=l
where the h(i) were assumed to be fixed (the h's
sum must also equal one ifa permanent increase
in inflation is eventually anticipated).
Assume, for illustrative purposes only, that
prices immediately adjust to current money-
stock changes Am(t); that is, that Am(t) = Ap(t).
Then even in this simple case, a counter-cyclical
policy rule of (say) the form:
.im(t) = cou(t-l) (5)
will influence cyclical fluctuations in unemploy-
ment. To see this, substitute from (5) into (4) to
relate expected price changes to past unemploy-
ment:
u(t) = ao + alu(t-l) + a2u(t-2) - a3cou(t-l)
Then, since actual price changes equal current
money. stock changes, unemployment can be
written as:
The last two terms in unemployment have been
added by the counter-cyclical policy and the ex-
pectations mechanism (4). These terms change
thesizeand duration ofthe fluctuations in unem-
(7)
n
+ a3co~h(i)u(t-i-l) + e(t)
i=l
More generally, a "reaction" function relating
money-stock changes to past unemployment can
be designed so that business-cycle fluctuations
are reduced. This process is illustrated in Dia-
gram (1). A rise in unemployment caused by the
disturbance "e" leads, through the action of the
monetary authorities, to an increase in the mon-
ey stock, "m,"and then to an increase in the price
level, "p". The price level expected by individ-
uals, "pe", also rises, but by less than the actual
increase in prices. As a result, unemployment is
pushed back down toward its natural rate. As
this example indicates, stabilization policy is ef-
fective because the authorities are able to make
the difference between actual and anticipated in-
flation depend upon past unemployment. They
can do this because the relation used to forecast
price fluctuations does not change when policy is
altered. 10
Influence of rational expectations
Rational expectations refers to an economic
theory explaining how individuals predict eco-
nomic events. Because the theory has most often
been applied to models incorporating the natu-







9confused,Theconceptsare actually quite dis-
tinct, andindeedrational-expectations.theory is
justas applicable to models inwhich the natural-
rate hypothesis is invalid astothose in which it is
correct.
RatiOnal:expectatioIls theQry asserts that pri-
vateagents forecast economic events in much the




spect, the rational-expectations model is little
differentfromother forecasting models incorpo-
ratedin most natural-rate formulations: all im-
plythatagentsusepastdata to predict economic
variables. l1 However, rational expectations also
implies thatindividuals continually update their
prediction schemes on the basis of new informa-
tion. This means that when economic behavior
changes~in particular, when government policy
isaltered~individuals' forecasting relations are
changed also. Accordingto this aspect ofthe the-
ory,anYcounter-cyclical monetary policy based
entirely on agents' misperceptions about prices
and other observable variables must eventually
become ineffective.
To see this, consider again the model sum-
marizedin relations (4) through (6). Counter-
cyclical policy is effective in this case because in-
dividualsunderpredict actual price level changes
when. unemployment is above its natural rate,
while they do the opposite when unemployment
is below the natural rate. Rational-expectations
theory asserts that individuals notice these rela-
tions. They then improve their predictions by
raising their original forecasts when unemploy-
ment is high and reducing them when it is low. In
thisway, agents discover the policy rule used by
the government to combat business cycles. But
when this happens the policy becomes ineffec-
tive, because it produces only predictable vari-
ations in prices and money. This is illustrated in
Diagram (2). As before, a rise in unemployment
leads to an increase in the money stock. Howev-
er, under rational expectations, anticipated price
changes,
~p(t)e =cou(t-I) (8)
areexactly equal to actual price changes. Unem-
ployment and the business cycle are thus unaf-
fected. 12
This viewofcollnter-cyclical·monetarypblicy
is notwidely accepted. Most.economists believe
that counter-cyclical monetary policy can influ-
ence unemployment and real output in the short
run, but that it has no significant permanent ef-
fect. Some economists, skeptical about the policy
implications of combined natural rate and ra-
tional expectations theories, have questioned the
practical validity ofthe rational expectations hy-
pothesis.
Rational expectations is, however, simply one
aspect ofthe more general assumption that indi-
viduals are rational. Economists normally as-
sume that individuals are able to maximize their
satisfaction (given their income) and that firms
are able to minimize costs (given available re-
sources). But this hypothesis is tenable onlyif
economic agents effectively use·all information
available to them. Rational-expectations theory
merely asserts that agents do just thatwhen pre-
dicting economic variables.
On the other hand, less plausible assumptions
underlie those theories in which only unantici-
pated price and money-supply changes influence




u-sume thatthereare no institutional impediments
to free, continuous·adjustment· of prices and
wages. Perceived money-stock changes are often
assumed tolead immediately to offsetting price-
level movements, leaving unaffected such varia-
bles as agents' real money balances, real output,
andthe relative prices ofgoods and factors. Pre-
dictableattemptsby the government to restrict
or expand money-supply growth then only pro-
duce offsetting price-level fluctuations, with no
dffdcforiecollol11icactivity.
Prices and wages are not actually adjusted in
this l11a.ririet.Sol11e product andfactor prices are
contractually set for fixed periods. Others that
appear variable in principle are not actually so,
butinstead tend to respond primarily to long-run
rather than cyclical fluctuations in demand. AL-
though the reasons for such behavior are not
entirely understood, the implication is that vari-
ations in money growth produce temporary fluc-
tuations in private real-money balances.13
Theoretically, such transient variations in real
balances can influence economic activity: indi-
viduals with temporary excess cash may choose
to increase their spending, for example. 14 Econo-
mists differ, however, about their actual impact.
Some believe that fluctuations in real balances
have a negligible impact on real aggregate de-
mand, whiIeothersassigna more prominent role
tosuchchanges. Indeed, in manylargeeconome-
tric ••. m(}dels""-including several for Japan15-
temporary variations in liquidity caused by
changesinmoneygrowth significantly affect at
leastsome spending components.
Predictablechanges in money growth thusmay
exertsignificant temporary impacts on economic
activity, even when expectations are rationally
formed.•More generally, the impact of both un-
anticipated and.anticipated money growth may
vary with institutional factors. For example,the
effect ofanticipated money growth on activity
may depend on the degree to which prices and
wages fluctuate with variations in the money
stock, as argued above. This impact may also de-
pend upon the extent to which close substitutes
for money are available to individuals and firms,
as well as other factors. Consequently, the influ-
ence of anticipated and unanticipated money
growth could vary among countries. Barro (3,
1977) andSargent (8,1976), on the basis ofU.8.,
evidence, suggest that anticipated money growth
has no influence on economic activity, but the
evidence presented here would suggest otherwise
for Japan.
II. Testing the Hypothesis: Estimation of Anticipated Money Growth
The hypothesis concerning the relationship be-
tween anticipated money-stock changes and Jap-
anese economic activity is particularly sig-
nificant for Japan because few other industrial
countries have relied so heavily on monetary
policy as a tool ofstabilization policy. Indeed, the
Japanese until recently have utilized fiscal poli-
cy, by and large, only to accomplish longer-term
economic objectives. 16
Various studies-such as Keran (4, 1970) and
the OECD (9, 1972)-suggest that Japanese
monetary policy has affected real output in a
substantial and systematic way. However, these
studies do not distinguish between anticipated
and unanticipated components ofmoney growth,
and thus do not directly reveal the impact ofpre-
dictable counter-cyclical changes in the money
stock. Indeed, it is possible that such estimates
reflect theimpacton real activity ofunanticipat-
ed money growth only. Thus the hypothesis that
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anticipated money changes influence real output
must still be tested.
Testing this proposition is complicated by the
fact that expectations are not directly observ-
able. But following the procedure adopted by
Barro (3, 1977) in his U.S. study, we can esti-
mate the anticipated components of money
growthunder the assumption that agents' predic-
tions are rational in the sense defined earlier.
More exactly, we can develop a "prediction"
equation relating historically observed money-
stock changes to other variables; on the assump-
tion that economic agents had at least a rough
knowledge ofthis relation, we may use the fitted
values from the equation as estimates of antici-
pated money growth. The unanticipated compo-
nents are then defined as the actual changes
minus the predicted elements.
If this procedure is to be acceptable, the esti-
mated predicted money-growth componentsmustbe based on commonly available data. Ac-
cordingly,theiequationdeveloped ihere related
a()tualmon~ygrowthduring a given quarter to
datafrom earlier quarters. Similarly, the rela-
tiQnshouldbe .consistent with the processes
actuallyd~termining •.money-stock.changes=es"
peciaHy •officialpolicies--,duringthe.period ex-
arnil1ed.F'or this reason, it will be useful to
brieflyreviewJapanese monetary policy overthe
1951-71period.
Japane$e•mouetarypoUcy
As many. writers have emphasized, Japanese
monetary policy is heavily influenced by institu-
tional Jactors.Large-scale .open-market oper-
ationshavenot been feasible, so that central-
bank credit has provided the primary source of
the banking system's reserve growth. As a result,
the major commercial banks are net debtors to
the Bank of JapanY
Consequently, the BankofJapan has exerted a
substantial de facto influence on bank lending
policies. This influence has been reinforced, par-
ticularly during the 1960's, by "window guid-
ance", an informal device whereby the central
bank fixes ceilings on individual banks' aggre-
gate lending as well as on their credit to particu-
lar sectors. Although there is no legal basis for
the ceilings, the Bank's wishes have generally
been respected. Thus the Bank generally has
been more successful than the central banks of
other major industrial countries in implementing
its objectives for money growth. 18
Japan's money stock has grown very rapidly
over time, reflecting the nation's exceptionally
rapid economic growth. Money stock (M1)
growth averaged 16.5 percent annually from
1957:1 through 1977:3, compared to 4.4 percent
for the U.s. over the same period. In contrast to
the US., Japan's average rate of money growth
was the same over the latter halfofthis period as
during the first half (Table 1).
Table 1
Japanese and U.S. M1 Growth Rates






Over shortertime periods, however, Japanese
M1changeshavefluctuatedsubstantially (Chart
1). For example, money growth was below aver-
age,iandmonetarypolicy was relatively restric-
tiv(:,fromroughly1961:2 through 1962:2 and
agllinfrom1963:3 through 1964:4. Money
growth waS relatively ••rapid over •the interval
1962:4to 1963:2,.during 1971, and from mid-
1972through mid-1973. 19
[)uringthe1950'sand 1960's,periods ofmone-
taryrestrictionwere normallyinitiated by a dete-
rioration in Japan's balance of payments, while
periodsofeasenormally occurred when econom-
icactivity hadslow.ed sufficiently to restore ex-
ternal balance. AccQrding to most accounts, a
business-cycle expansion typically would lead to
atraqedeficit, producing a deterioration in the
balance of payments and international reserve
outflows. The resulting drain in private bank re-
serves, combined with Bank of Japan credit re-
strictions, w.ould then lead to a deceleration of
money growth and force a reduction in the ex-
Pansionofprivate bank credit. The reduction in
bank.lending (these accounts assert) particularly
affected the corporate business sector-which is
heavily dependent on commercial banks for ex-
ternalfunds-and through it private investment.
Japanese monetary policy thus was aimed
more at offsetting the impact of business-cycle
fluctuations on official reserves, than in reducing
variations in real income.2o For example, the de-
clineintheM1growth rate from 1961:2 through
1962:2was accompanied, indeed preceded, by a
faHin the growth rate of gold and foreign-ex-
change reserves. The pattern was similar, al-
though less pronounced, during the subsequent
cycle in money growth from 1962:2 through
1964:4 (Chart 1).
Systematic relations between Japanese M1
growth and reserve fluctuations diminished con-
siderablyafter 1970. Japanese reserves increased
dramatically in 1971 as the government initially
resistedrevaluation ofthe yen. As a result ofthis
accu.mulation ofreserves, the Bank ofJapan had
muchless need to use monetary policy to offset
temporary balance-of"payments fluctuations.21
Japan's economic environment changed even
more dramatically beginning in 1973. The ad-
vel)tofgeneralized floating freed the Bank ofthe
obligation (although not necessarily the desire)Chart 1
Changes in Japanese Money Supply(M1) and Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves






















ofcontinuously defending a fixed exchange rate.
This development further weakened the direct
influenceofreserves ondomestic money. In addi-
tion, inflation accelerated sharply, leading the
government eventually to reduce money growth
in orderto bring price increases back to historical
rates. This suggests that fluctuations in Japanese
money growth after 1970 may be better ex-
plained by variations in foreign and domestic in-
flation rates than by changes in reserves.
Prediction equation
A statistical analysis of Japanese money-sup-
ply changes supports these observations. (In
choosing a measure, M 1 data was used to facili-
tate comparisons with other studies of the deter-
minants of Japanese money growth.)22 Prior to
1971, variations in M 1 growth appear to be posi-
tively and significantly related to changes in Ja-
pan's gold and foreign-exchange reserves.
Subsequently the two are not significantly asso-
ciated. Insteadvariations in M, growth appear to
be more closely related to the difference between
13
Japanese and U.S. consumer-price inflation.
Since maintenance of a stable exchange rate re-
quires that domestic and foreign prices ofsimilar
goods grow at the same average rate, this rela-
tion may reflect the Japanese authorities' at-
temptto prevent largechanges in thedollar value
of the yen, even under floating exchange rates.
A numberofequations explaining Japanese M,
growth fit the 1957-77 sample period about
equally well. Generally the more complex the es-
timated relation, the greater the likelihood that
variables will be included that were not actually
used by individuals to forecast M 1 growth. The
"predicted" M 1 changes estimated from such a
relation will then include a portion of money
growth that was actually unanticipated; antici-
pated changes may then appear to affect activity
when in fact their influencereflects the impactof
unpredicted M, changes. For this reason, a rela-
tively simple relation explaining M 1 growth was
chosen (Table 2).
To see how Japan's balance of payments af-fected her money stock in the pre-1971 period,
suppose that the growth.of reserves rises for a
single quarter by one percentage point. The
~uationimpliesthat M1growth will be raised by
'~~percent in thenext quarter and by .05 percent
inthe quarter thereafter. This response reflects
tllefacnhatJapanesegold andforeign exchange
reserves were only about 7 percent of Japanese
M1during this period; the equation also implies
that a decline of one dollar in reserves led to a
t()~alfall ofroughly 520 yen in Japanese M1over
thenext two quarters, or nearly 1.5 dollars at the
e~chal1geratethenprevailing.23
Thepost-1970 equation suggests that the Japa-
nese authorities manipulated money growth to
ke.ep the Japanese-U.S. inflation relationship
within a range consistent with a stable exchange
rate for the yen. Suppose that the ratio ofJapa-
nese to U.S. consumer prices rises for one quarter
by one percentage point. The equation implies
tllatJa.l>am~seM1 eventually declines by 1.25
percent (Table 2). That is, Japanese money, and
eventl1ally Japanese prices, subsequently fallby
nearly the sameproportion as the initial increase
in the relative inflation rates. Thus the authori-
ties apparently attempt to offset changes inrela-
tive inflation rates in order to maintain a stable
exchange rate. As Chart 2 indicates, the general
patternofvariations in actual M 1growth in both
periods is reflected reasonably well in the
values.
Measures of anticipated .and unanticipated
money growth can be extracted from these pre-
diction ~uations. Anticipated money growth is
defined as the values of M 1 growth predicted
from the equations in Table 2. Unanticipated
money growth is simply the difference between
actual and anticipated money changes. These
Table 2
Money Prediction Equations1
Period: 1958:1 - 1970:4
DMIA(t) = .02 + .044 X DRSA(t-l) + .052 X DRSA (t-2) + .209 X DMIA(t-1) + .226 X DMIA(t-2)
(4.43)(1.21) (1.35) (1.41) (1.75)
Period: 1971:1 -1977:3
DMIA(t) = .020 - .533 X (DJCPI(t-2) - DUSCPI(t-3» + .576 X DMIA(t-l)
(4.43) (-3.00) (5.41)









Memorandum: Sum ofCoefficients of DRSA= .096
(2.88)
Notes: 'The estimates were derived from a single equation applied to the entire sample, using multiplicative dummy variables.
2DMIA = Difference between the current and previous quarter's logarithm of seasonally adjusted M,.
DRSA= Difference between the current and previous quarter's logarithm of seasonally adjusted gold and foreign-
exchange reserves.
DJCPI= Difference between the current and previous quarter's logarithm ofthe Japanese CPI.
DUSCPI = Difference between the current and previous quarter's logarithm of the U.s. CPI.
3This is the square root ofthe sum of squared residuals divided by the number of observations; these are not strictly
comparable with the standard error of the entire sample.
'Figures in parentheses are "T" statistics.
14Chart 2
JapalleseMoney Supply(M1) Growth Rates






























components can be used to test the extent to relation has been fairly stable over a long period
which predicted M, growth influenced Japanese of time. Under such circumstances, it is reason-
economic activity. able to suppose that individuals at least had an
As we have seen, however, the relation explain- approximate knowledge ofthe relation and could
ing money growth apparently changed in 1971. have used it to forecast. When (as appears to
The predicted M, changes are most likely to re- have been the case) the relation changes signifi-
flect expectations held by economic agents if the cantly, this presumption becomes less plausible.
m. Impact of Anticipated and Unanticipated Money Changes
on Japanese Economic Activity
Three separate hypotheses should be tested: 1) growth relationships.
that neither anticipated nor unanticipated These propositions are tested here by regress-
changes in the money stock influence economic ing alternative measures of real activity on their
activity in the long run; 2) that anticipated mon- own past values, and on current and past values
ey-stock variations have no impact on real activ- of the estimated (predicted and unpredicted)
ity; and 3) that unanticipated money-growth components ofmoney In addition, a time
changes stimulate real activity in the short run. trend is included to allow for secular changes in
The first proposition is simply the natural-rate real growth. The two dependent variables exam-
hypothesis; it does not preclude a short-run influ- ined are changes in the logarithms ofJapanese
ence of money on real output. The second hy- industrial production and real GNP. Industrial
pothesis-the focus ofthis article-suggests that production is included because, according to pre-
counter-cyclical monetary policy will have no vious studies, money-growth variations particu~
systematic influence on activity once agents larly affect the·corporate-business sector, and
determine how the policy is being conducted. hence industrial activity. The reader interested
The third proposition is frequently used to ex- primarily in the conclusions may wishto skip the
plain temporary unemployment-inflation-money unavoidably technical "Analysis ofestimates".
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The basic equation was:
7 7 4
ilX(t) = aO + al X T + ~a2(i)DMP(t-i) + ~a3(i)DMR(t-i) + ~a4(i) X (t-i)
i=O i=O i=1
where AX(t) is the activity variable, T is a time trend, DMP is predicted money growth and DMR is unanticipated money
growth. The AX, DMP, and DMR were also expressed as percentages (i.e. multiplied by 100). ACochrane-Orcuttcorrection for
first-order serial correlation of the disburbance was also applied.
Sources: i) Industrial Production: OECD Main Economic Indicators, Historical Statistics.
ii) Real GNP; Investment: OECD Quarterly National Income Accounts.
Notes: 1) Figures in parentheses are "T" statistics.
2) Industrial Production and Real GNP are seasonally adjusted.
Table 4
Summary of Statistics Testing the Hypotheses+
HO H1
Change in the Logarithm of Industrial Production 0.48 6.42**













F test of the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of anticipated and unanticipated money growth are zero. The
hypothesis is rejected at the 5-percent level (with 50 degrees of freedom) if the statistic exceeds 3.18.
F testofthe hypothesis that all the coefficients ofanticipated money growth are zero, against the alternative that some of
the coefficients of both components may not be zero. The hypothesis is rejected at the 5-percent level (with 50 degrees of
freedom and seven restrictions) if the statistic exceeds 2.20.
Ftest ofthe hypothesis that the coefficients ofunanticipated money growth are all zero, against the same alternative as in
HI.The critical 5-percent value is also the same.
F test ofthe hypothesis that all the coefficients of both money components are zero. The hypothesis is rejected (with 50
degrees offreedom and 14 restrictions) if the statistic exceeds 1.90.
Since a Cochrane-Orcutt procedure was applied, these statistics are only asymptotically distributed as "F".
Significant at the 5-percent level.
Significant at the I-percent level.
16Analysis ofestimates
The estimates were obtained by allowing lags
ofseven quarters for the money-growth compo-
nents and four quarters for the lagged dependent
variables.24Theresults aresummarizedin Tables
3 and 4. To simplify the presentation, only the
sums ofthe coefficients over the indicated lags
are listed in Table 3, whilethe individual coeffi-
cients are listed in Appendix A.
The results supportthe natural-rate hypothesis
thatmoney-stock changes exert no permanent
influence on economic activity. This.hypothesis
implies that thesums ofthecoefficients ofantici-
pated and unanticipated money growth both
equal zero. In other words, an acceleration in
economic activity following an increase in money
must be fully offset by a laterdeceleration in pro-
duction ifthe level ofactivity is to be unaffected
in the long run.25 As shown in the first column of
Table IV, the long-run natural-rate hypothesis
could not be rejected at the 5 percent confidence
level for either of the relations. Variations in M,
growth thus showed no long-run impact on either
Japanese industrial production or real GNP.
Consequently, the natural-rate hypothesis is im-
posed on the estimates presented in Table 3, and
this relationship holds for the remainder of this
discussion.26
Anticipated money growth apparently had a
substantial and significant short-run impact on
Japa.nese industrial production and a smaller but
still significant effect on real GNP. As shown in
thesecondcoblmnofTable4, thehypothesis that
all the predicted money growth coefficients are
zeroiseasilyrejected (at weU above the 1percent
confidence level) for industrial production, and
can als(fberejected for real GNP: atleastsome
of these coefficients then .• differ significantly
from zero. Thus, contrary to most formulations
of the natural-rate hypothesis, anticipated mon-
eygrowthhashadaneffect emJapaneseeconom-
ic activity.
Finally, unanticipated money growth appar-
ently shows a much different impact than antici-
pated money expansion. The hypothesis of zero
influence on activity-that is, aU zero coeffi-
cients--can be rejected for industrial production
butnot for real GNP, as seen in the third column
ofTable 4. An unanticipated rise in M 1 initially
raises real-output growth; however, this effect is
relatively small and statistically insignificant
(Appendix A and Table 3). But in the following
two quarters, thegrowth ofreal output is actual-
ly depressed by the unpredicted money increase.
Thus the natural-rate hypothesis-that unantici-
pated money growth stimulates real activity-is
not supported by these results. Any stimulus
from unanticipated money growth apparently
was both small and temporary-at least in Ja-
pan,ifnot the U.S.
Assume that M, increases for one quarter by
Table 5
Impact of a One Percent Rise in the Money Growth Rate
Sustained Over One Quarter
Percentage Rise in Growth
of Industrial Production if:


















































































.00one percentagepoint.Ifthe increase is anticipat-
ed,the growth ofindustrial production is imme-
diatelyraised by one-half percent (Table 5).
IndustriaLproduction continues to rise above its
normal level, and by the third quarter it is nearly
two percent.above the level it would otherwise
hayereaqhc;:d.But subsequently, production de-
clille~backtoward its•long-run level, and after
three years it is virtually unaffected by the an-
ticipated M 1 increase.
IftheMjincrease is unanticipated, the impact
on industrial production is both qualitatively dif-
ferentandmore modest in size, with an 0.8 per-
cent.dec]ine below its normal level by the fourth
quarter. But again, the impactofthe M1increase
is again largely dissipated after the end of three
years.
Implications ofresults
What do these results imply about Japanese
monetary policy over the 1957-77 period? First
of all, anticipated increases in money growth
stimulated real economic activity-particularly
industrial production-while anticipated reduc-
tions in money growth depressed activity. Coun-
tercylical monetary policy was thus at least
potentially effective in reducing Japanese busi-
ness-cycle fluctuationsP The results are consis-
tent in this respect with previous studies of
Japanese monetary policy. At the same time,
they are incompatible with those rational-expec-
tations formulations of the natural-rate hypoth-
esis that deny any systematic relationship
between counter-cyclical monetary policy and
real economic activity.
Indeed, the findings for Japan are nearly the
opposite ofthose obtained by Barro for the U.S.
Using annual data, he found that anticipated
money growth had no impact on the U.S. unem-
ployment rate, whereas unanticipated money
growth led to a reduction in unemployment last-
ing for nearly three years. The results for Japan
imply that any stimulus generated by unantici-
pated money growth is, at best, small and quite
short-lived. Thus in Japan, the predictable part
ofmoneygrowth affected real output most heav-
ily,whileinthe U.s., only unanticipated money
grqwthinfiuencedeconomic activity.
In.stitutional features possibly may account for
some ofthesedifferences in national behavior. In
Ja.pan,short-termcapitalmarkets arelessdevel-
oped and>Close substitutes for money arethus
less available-than in the U.S. Moreover, Japa-
nese corporations are strongly dependent upon
the private banking sector for externalfunds, be-
causeoflherelatively underdeveloped nature of
the bond and equity markets. This suggeststhat
Japanese corporations' expenditures may depend
more heavily on their real money balances than
do the expenditures of their U.s. counterparts,
and thus may respond more to anticipated mon-
ey~growth fluctuations.
It is also conceivable that the contrasting re-
sults reflect differences in U.S. and Japanese
monetarypolicies during the period examined. In
Japan, M 1 grew (on average) at a stable pace,
whereas in the U.S. money growth generally in-
creased from the mid-1960's through the early
1970's.28 This suggests that an unexpected accel-
eration of money in the U.s. was often followed
by further above-average increases; in Japan, on
the other hand, money acceleration was general-
ly followed within several quarters by decelera-
tion. Consequently, an unanticipated money
change in Japan, once perceived by individuals,
possibly could have had a more temporary im-
pact on real balances than would have been the
case in the U.s. Iftrue, this factor may help ex-
plain theapparently different impactofunantici-
pated money growth on real output in the two
countries.29
The results must, in any case, be regarded as
tentative-particularly regarding the findings
for unanticipated money growth.3D Nonetheless,
they suggest that, in Japan at least, counter-cy-
clical monetary policy can be used effectively to
reduce fluctuations in real activity.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
The apparent failure in recent years of macro-
economic policy to alleviate conditions of simul-
taneous inflation and unemployment has disap-
pointed many advocates of counter-cyclical
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economic policies. During the late 1960's, many
economists believed that it would soon be possi-
ble to "fine tune" variations in economic activ-
ity-that the objectives of price stability andcontinuous full employment could be reconciled.
Recent proposals for the adoption of incomes
policies are, in part, an indicator of the current
disillusionment with the traditional macro-eco-
nomic tools that were supposed to accomplish
these policy goals. Some economists have come
to question whether counter-cyclical policies
have (or indeed ever had) any consistent impact
on economic activity, even in the short run.
The resuits presented in this article suggest
that this view of the impotency of policy is not
applicable to Japan. Ifthis conclusion is correct,
counter-cyclical policies can theoretically be
used to reduce business-cycle fluctuations. Offi-
cials who design and implement Japanese mone-
tary policy are thus not irrelevant, as some
economists have in effect suggested. But the task
confronting them today is almost surely more
complicated than was generally believed during
much ofthe 1960's.
A decade ago, economists tended to bdieve in
the stability ofthe relationships among inflation,
employment, and real economic activity. In the
U.s., for example, the increase in inflation asso-
ciated with a given reduction in the unemploy-
ment rate apparently remained constant for
wany years. Many economists thus came tobe-
lieve that economic theory, aided by the sophisti-
cated econometric models then being developed,
could exploit such relations to ameliorate the ef-
fects of business-cycle fluctuations.
It now seems clear that such relations, which
shifted distressingly often as inflation acceler-
ated over the past decade, were actually more
complex than had originally been thought. Many
economists now believe that changes in prices,
money, and other variables that are anticipated
by private individuals have different effects than
those changes that are unanticipated. This view
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helps explain why "stable" relations between in-
flation and unemployment fluctuated as mone-
tary policy changed and as inflation accelerated
in the•U.S. and other industrial countries. Ac-
cording to this view, theamount ofinflation asso-
ciated with a given level ofunemployment in the
U.S. is higher now than a decade ago, in large
partbecauseactual and expected average money
growth has been higher than during the 1960's.
The results for Japan are quite consistent with
this approach. Apparently, anticipated money
growth substantially, although temporarily,
stimulates.real economic activity. Unanticipated
money growth apparently has a significantly dif-
ferent impact; it may raise activity for one quar-
ter, but then seems to depress activity for some
time thereafter.
Thus, it appears that Japanese policy-makers
cannot mechanically manipulate private real ac-
tivity in the manner suggested by the theories of
the 1960's. An official interested in determining
the impact ofa given M 1 increase on real output,
for example, must first ask his staffhow much of
the planned change is expected by the market.
And while policy-makers study the market's be-
havior, they must also know that the market is
studying their own reactions. Ifit were true that
predictable policy-generated changes in money
do not affect real economic activity, the task fac-
ing Japaneseofficials would be not only difficult,
but ultimately futile. Fluctuations in real income
could then be offset by monetary policy only to
the extent that the authorities were able to con-
fuse the market about actual official intentions.
A policy of this type could hardly enhance offi-
cials' credibility. But the results derived in this
article suggest that Japanese policy-makers may
be both predictable and effective in using
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Notes: Figures in parentheses are "T" statistics
2 Changes expressed as percentages (i.e. multiplied times 100)
20FOOTNOTES
1; Fora brief description of the influence on U.S. policy, see
Robert J. Gordon, "Recent Developments in the Theory oflnfla-
tion sndUnemployment," Journal ofMonetary Economics, (2).
1976, p. 190. David Laidler and MichaelParkin, "Inflation, a Sur-
vey", Economic Journal, December 1975, pp. 741-809 and
Rutledge (1975) provide more detailed surveys of the evolution
oftneoriesaboutthe Phillips Curve and about monetary policy
and economic activity.
2. In the model in the tllxt, a, snda, must be chosen so that
unemployment·is stationary. Ingenerafthe greaterthe response
of current unemployment toits past, the greater the severity and
the longer the duration of business cycles.
3. The "Phillips Curve" became a significant influence on eco-
nomic policy with the publication of A. W. Phillips, "The Relation
Between Unemployment aodthe Ratllof Chahgeo! Money
Waglls, 1862-1957," Economics, November 1958, pp. 283-
299. This deSCribes an apparently stable relation between mon-
eywage changes and unemployment in the United Kingdom over
the period 1862-1957.
4. Policy prescriptions to exploit the Phillips Curve were gener-
ally described in somewhat different terms. Price changes were
assumed to be positively related to excess demand, proxied by
the unemployment rate. The implication was that by raising ag-
gregate demand, through either fiscal ormonetary policy, unem-
ployment could be reduced while inflation would be raised.
5. Strictly speaking, the neutrality proposition refers only to un-
sustained changes in the level of money, not to changes in the
rate of inflation. Variations in the inflation rate alter the real re-
turn to money balances and may, as a result, affect the demand
for capital; if so, ihe natural rate of unemployment will not be
invariant to the long-run rate of money growth. The proposition
thatthe natural rate is unaffected bythe rate of inflation is some-
times referred to as "super-neutrality." Natural-rate theorists
assert that this is a valid approximation of actual behavior.
6. The first complete description of the elements of the natural-
rate hypothesis was given by Milton Friedman ("The Role of
Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, May 1968).
Friedman defined the natural rate as that which would be deter-
mined in a general-equilibrium system of excess-demand rela-
tions for commodities and factors; these relations were
assumed to be functions of relative prices and invariant to move-
ments in the general price level. Variations in unemployment
about the natural rate were assumed to result (in part) from un-
anticipated movements in the price level. Strictly speaking, his
account implied only that a permanent rise in inflation would
have no long-run impact on unemployment; it did not rule out the
possibility that an accelerating rate might have an impact.
7. This was one of the elements of Friedman's original state-
ment of the natural-rate hypothesis. It was also central to at-
tempts by Phelps and others to develop a micro-economic
theory of the temporary Phillips Curve based on incomplete in-
formation and costly search in the labor market. See E. Phelps
(ed.), The Microeconomlc Foundations of Employment and
Inflation Theory. The reader will have noticed that the natural-
rate hypothesis and formulations of the natural-rate theory are
distinguished in the text. The reason is that many economists
who accept the proposition that the Phillips Curve is vertical in
the long run do not accept all elements of what are commonly
known as natural-rate theories. In this sense Friedman stated
both the natural·rate hypothesis and a theory of the natural rate,
the latter being more restrictive.
8. This is essentially the account given by Robert Barro in "Ra-
tional Expectations and the Role of Monetary Policy", Journal
of Monetary Economics, (2), 1976. pp. 1-33.
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9. Actually the theory implies that the unemployment rate is a
function ofthe difference between thesctual and expected price
level. Assuming that agents know last period'sprice level, how-
ever, Ap(t) - Ap(t)e = (p(t) .... p(t-l» .... (pe(t)) - p(t-1)) =
pet) - pe(t), so (3) is consistent with the theory.
10.. This assumptionwas often implicit. That is.in simulationsof
econometric models, the h(i) wereas.sumed invariant to the poli-
cyassumptions. This.methodology had been forcefully criticized
by Thomas Sargent and Neal Wallace ("Rational Expectations
and the Theory ofEconomic Policy", Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, (2), i976, pp. i68-184).
11 .• Indeed, the theory is really a furtherdllvelopment of earlier
notions abouthow expectations Were fonned; Adaptive'expec-
tations schemes wereoriginaHy introduced because they
seemed to provide a common-sense method for forecasting
economic variables. Rational expectations provides a more pre-
cise definition of what it means to forecast "sensiblY".
12. Several qualifications of this view are worth noting. First, a
basis for counter-cyclical policy exists if the government pos-
sesses superior information, that is, information not available to
the market. For example, suppose that the government could
withhold aggregate unemployment statistics from the market.
Then it could successfully carry out the counter-cyclical policy
summarized in equation (4) because individuals would not pos-
sess the data needed to forecast money growth. Proponents of
the combined rational-expectations and natural-rate theories
generally argue that the government should publish its informa-
tion and allow individuals to decide how to respond to it. See
Robert Barro, op. cit., p. 2. Second. the rational-expectations
and natural-rate theories do not imply that government policy
has no impact on variations in unemployment, only that it has no
systematic impact. If the government policy is prone to error-
that is, if the policy produces unanticipated money-stock
changes-it will generally raise the variability of unemployment.
This is not usually regarded as a desirable objective.
13. Indeed, if commodity markets were efficient in the sense of-
ten used in stock-market literature, price-level changes would
be random so long as the long-run inflation rate were constant.
Underthese circumstances, cyclical variations in nominal money
would lead to cyclical variations in real balances. Fora review of
theories of contract pricing and other "rigidities". see Robert J.
Gordon, op. cit_, pp. 185-219. Richard J. Sweeney, "Efficient In-
formation Processing in Output Markets: Tests & Implications,"
Economic Inquiry, July 1978 provides theoretical and empirical
arguments for commodity-market efficiency.
14. The reason is that changes in real balances affect the utility
yield of existing holdings. For example. in William Brock's per-
fect-foresight model, ("Money and Growth: the Case of Long
Run Perfect Foresight", International Economic Review, Octo-
ber 1974, pp. 750-777), a pre-announced increase in future mon-
ey growth leads to an immediate increase in prices and will
generally alter consumption if goods can be stored.
15. For example, in the reconstructed Bank of Japan macro-
model, the availability of credit to the corporate sector is an ex-
planatory variable in relations determining inventory and private
fixed investment; real liquid deposits of the private household
sector are used in the equations for consumption as well. See H.
EguChi and S. Tanigawa. "The Bank of Japan Econometric Mod-
el-AProgress Report on its Reconstruction" in Proceedings
of the Second Pacific Basin Central Bank Conference on
Econometric Modeling, June 1976.
16.Deficit finance became legally permitted in 1965. Ackley
and Ishi (1976) have argued that even afterthis date, fiscal poli-
cy was primarily directed at objectives other than counter-cycli-cal policy (p. 231).
17.·See, for example, Keran (1970) pp. 174-175.ln addition, the
QECD (1972), pp. 1-32 and Ackley and Ishi (1970), pp. 196-
205, provide detailed descriptions of the institutional setting of
Japanese monetarypoliGY.
18. According to the OECD, for example, "The Bank of Japan
influenced the banks' lending attitude, buttressed by its ability to
control (ration the volume and raise the cost of) its own credit,
the predominant source Of reserve money in Japan. The restraint
on the<availability of domelltic bank credit was subsequently
conlloliQateQby direct quantitative controls on the major banks'
lending...Adeceierationof bank-credit expansion aiways set in
immediately after the first restrictive action of the central bank:
In each case, the degree of this slowdown seems to have been
generally in linewith that aimed at by the authorities" (p. 9). See
also Ackley and Ishi, pp. 204-205. Keran (176-177) views "win-
dowguidance"asprimarily a device designed to share business
among banks, rather than as a device to control the aggregate
level of credit.
19. The precilleperiods in the text refer to money-growth rates.
The periods of "severe restraint" identified by the OECD (pp.
87 ~90)arequite similar although, because reserve losses
themselves tended to reduce money expansion, they tended to
lag the slowdown by about a quarter.
20. The relation between reserve losses and M, growth has
been extensively documented by Keran, Ackley and Ishi, and the
OECD. Keran develops a compact model of the relation between
economic activity and reserve changes on the one hand and be-
tween activity and monetary policy on the other. The OECD
study, pp. 51-58 and Appendix III, discusses the impact of mon-
etary policy on investment; see also Ackley and Ishi, pp. 193-
195.
21. Total Japanese reserves more than tripled over 1971, from
$4.8 billion at the end of 1970 to $15.4 billion at the end of 1971.
Largely as a result, Japanese M, rose by nearly 30 percent dur-
ing 1971. Keran (p. 189) describes the severe reserve con-
straint faced by Japan during the 1960's.
22. See Keran; the OECD; Robert Gordon, "World Inflation and
MOnetary Accommodation in Eight Countries", Brookings Pa-
pers on Economic Activity, 1977:2; and Leroy D. Laney and
Thomas Willett, "The Causes of Global Monetary Expansion",
unpublished, August 1977. The first three use M, data in analyz-
ing the determinants of money growth and the latter analyze
both M, and M2• The Bank of Japan ("Role ofthe Money Supply in
the Japanese Economy", Special Paper #60, October 1975) ar-
gues that from 1965on, M2 changes were somewhat more close-
ly related to variations in prices and real income, but that prior to
1965, M, changes were generally slightly more correlated with
these variables. Forreasons explained later, the effects of mon-
ey growth on activity are evaluated using seasonally adjusted
data. Tlterefore, the M, and reserve series used in the money
prediGtion equation were also seasonally adjusted; the proce-
dure used was the multiplicative version of the Commerce De-
partment's X-ll applied to the level of each series.
23. The calculation in the text was made using 1965 year-end
values of gold and foreign-exchange reserves and the 1965 yen
value of the dollar (360.8). As Keran (p. 192) has shown, the
response of M, to reserve changes tended to vary with the com-
position of the Japanese government.
24. A correction for first-order serial correlation of the distur-
bance was also applied. Two other features of this procedure
should be noted. First, seasonally·adjusted data are used for
the activity variables and for money growth. Standard seasonal-
adjustment procedures may distort the temporal relations
among economic variables. Seasonally adjusted data were used
because no unadjusted figures for real GNP were available.
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N<:methelesll, results using such data must be interpreted with
caution. However, it was possible to estimate a relation similar
tothatinTablell using unadjusted money data (with seasonal
dummies)anQ<tousethis to evaluate the impact of money
growthonunadjusteQ inQulltrialproduction. The results obtained
ar~,ifanything.stronQerthanthose reported in the text. Sec'
ond, the procedure used is strictty valid only if current changes
inaCtiVity are assumed to have no impacton current changell in
M,.This d()esnot seem implausible in viewofthe relatively close
control normally maintained by the authorities over domestiG
money.However, ifitis not true, the estimates of the impact of
currentmoney growth on activity will be biased. Again, however,
the results arllnot substantially altered if the current money
growth terms are omitted.
25. This \Nillalso be true if all the coefficients of the money-
growth COmponents are zero. The argument in the text indicates
whY the estimated coefficients must change sign at least once if
thenatural'ratll hypothesis is to hold.
26. Whenthe natural-rate hypothesis is not imposed on the esti-
mates,thehypotheses that anticipated and unanticipated mon-
ey·growth components donot influence industrial production can
eaCh berejeGted. The hypothesis that predicted money has no
impact on real GNP cannot be rejected; however, the "F" statis-
tic iSGlose to the critical 5-percent value and is significant at the
to-percent leyel.
27. This does not, of course, mean that policy actually stabi-
lized Japan's real output. To establish this, the changes in out-
pUt .that would have occurred had the policy not been followed
would haye tobe compared with the actual path of output, a task
beyond the scope of this paper. Ackley and Ishi argue that the
authorities may have increased fluctuations in activity in an at-
temptlo avoid large reserve losses (pp. 170-171).
28. Kurt Dew has pointed out the contrasting structure of U.S.
and Japanese monetary policy. His article "Practical Monetar-
ism and the Stock Market" in the Spring 1978 issue of this Re-
view de.scribes the shift in U.S. monetary policy beginning,
roughlY,after 1970. He finds that after 1970, unanticipated mon-
eyinGreases in the U.S. tended to depress stock-market prices.
29. However, this argument is admittedly plausible only when (if
then) anticipated money growth influences real output. Suppose,
for example, that individuals' planned levels of spending de-
penQed upon their anticipated present and future levels of real
money balanGes. Imagine that money increases unexpectedly
anQ thatprices respond to this increase very slowly. Then indi-
viduals' real balances may be expected to be above normal for
sometime. In Japan, however, the impact on real balances may
haye peen more temporary than in the U.S., so that real output
was affected for a shorter time. Obviously the validity of this
argument depends upon the response of prices to money in-
creases.and on other factors. It also does not prOVide a satis-
faGtory explanation of why the level of real output falls below
normal in the quarters following an unanticipated rise in M" nor
does it explain why anticipated money had a stronger and more
persistent impact than in the U.S.
30. Several other relations were estimated which are 'not re-
porteQ here. First, similar equations were tried for changes in
theratio Of private non·residential fixed investment to GNP, and
in the ratio of inventory investmllnt to GNP (both seasonally ad-
justed).The results were very mixed; in general, when the long·
run natural·ratehypothesis is imposed, the hypothesis that an-
ticipateQ monllY has no impact cannot be rejected. As noted in a
previous tootnote, the hypothesis was also tested using sea-
sonally unadjusted M
"
reserve data, and industrial production.
These results-which are quite consistent with those report-
eQ anQthe investment relations will be supplied upon request
to the author.